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“Beauty is Truth and Truth Beauty”:  
How Intuitive Insights Shape Legal Reasoning and the 
Rule of Law 
Stephen M. Maurer* 
ABSTRACT 
Scientists have long recognized two distinct forms of human thought. 
“Type 1” reasoning is unconscious, intuitive, and specializes in finding 
complex patterns. It is typically associated with the aesthetic emotion that 
John Keats called “beauty.” “Type 2” reasoning is conscious, articulable, 
and deductive. Scholars usually assume that legal reasoning is entirely 
Type 2. However, critics from Holmes to Posner have protested that 
unconscious and intuitive judgments are at least comparably important. 
This Article takes the conjecture seriously by asking what science can add 
to our understanding of how lawyers and judges interpret legal texts. 
The analysis is overdue. Humanities scholars have long invoked 
findings from cognitive psychology, brain imaging, and neural network 
theory to argue that postmodern interpretations that ignore texts in favor 
of politics and cultural explanations are hopelessly incomplete. Similar 
arguments should be a fortiori stronger in law, where judges and scholars 
routinely stress the detailed wording of texts. 
The Article begins by reviewing previous attempts to apply literary 
theory to legal texts. We argue that the main failing of this literature is that 
it says little or nothing about how judges and advocates choose between 
competing legal interpretations. Section II argues that the best way to fill 
this gap is to ask what scientists have learned about the brain. This includes 
the fundamental insight that most human thought processes rely on both 
Type 1 and Type 2 methods. The Article also documents the surprising 
cognitive psychology result that Type 1 judgments show significant 
universality, i.e. that humans who study subjects for long periods often 
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make similar choices without regard to the societies they were born into. 
Section III extends these arguments to law by arguing that legal judgment 
frequently turns on the brain’s Type 1 pattern recognition machinery. The 
next two Sections build on this foundation to construct an explicit theory 
of how Type 1 thinking enters into legal reasoning and outcomes. Section 
IV begins by reviewing nineteenth century theories that claimed a leading 
role for intuitive reasoning in public policy. Section V updates these 
theories to accommodate the relatively weak statistical correlations that 
psychologists have documented, arguing that modern court systems 
amplify these signals in approximately determinate ways. It also explains 
why court systems that emphasize close textual analysis are able to resist 
erosion from competing incentives like cronyism and judicial activism. 
Section VI builds on these theory insights to suggest specific policy 
prescriptions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Beauty is Truth, [and] Truth Beauty” – John Keats (1795–1821)1  
Scholars have recognized since the eighteenth century that human 
thought proceeds through two distinct processes—what psychologists call 
“Type 1” (intuitive) and “Type 2” (logical).2 Type 1 usually dominates in 
                                                     
 1. John Keats, Ode on a Grecian Urn, in THE POEMS OF JOHN KEATS 372–73 (Jack Stillinger 
ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1978) (1820). 
 2. For a recent book-length account, see generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND 
SLOW (2011). Kahneman provides a useful table comparing the two modes. Id. at 105. The terms were 
originally coined by Keith Stanovich and Richard West. Id. at 48. 
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the arts, with Type 2 playing a supporting role at best. However, Type 1 
also hosts the brain’s capacity for pattern recognition, making it a reliable 
guide in fields where truth is defined by logic and experiment. Research 
in physics and mathematics often consists of extending Type 1 intuitions 
into Type 2 logical proofs. 
The hallmark of Type 1 processes is the mysterious aesthetic emotion 
that Keats called “beauty.” Modern brain scans confirm that the perception 
of beauty in art and mathematics is located in nearly identical regions of 
the brain. This makes it natural to ask how legal thought compares to art 
and mathematics. While legal scholars typically assume the primacy of 
logic, critics since Justice Holmes3 have protested that many cases are 
actually decided by the unconscious and intuitive methods that Judge 
Posner calls “practical reasoning.”4 
This Article takes these insights seriously by analyzing legal 
reasoning and the institutions based on it in explicitly Type 1 terms. This 
marks a fundamental change from older approaches that try to construct 
jurisprudence exclusively from Type 2 logic. The shortcomings of the 
latter approach are particularly evident in the decades-long agenda to find 
an intellectually coherent middle ground between formalists, who claim 
that legal texts are completely determinate, and realists, who see judges as 
entirely unconstrained. While most lawyers agree that such a middle 
ground exists, we will see that existing philosophy-of-language accounts 
based on narrowly Type 2 logic can only accommodate it at the cost of 
introducing ugly, ad hoc assumptions. This Article argues that progress 
will be better served by acknowledging the existence of Type 1 processes 
and asking how they enter the law. 
                                                     
 3. As Holmes famously declared, “The life of the law has not been logic: it has been 
experience . . . . The law . . . cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of 
a book of mathematics.” O.W. HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). Prof. Hawkins has 
persuasively argued that the word “experience” denotes subconscious intuition and, conversely, that 
Holmes saw formalist reasoning as “a vain attempt to systematize intuitively developed law.” Brian 
Hawkins, The Life of the Law: What Holmes Meant, 33 WHITTIER L. REV. 323, 323–76 (2012). 
 4. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATIONSHIP 287 (1988) 
(“[B]etween the extremes of logical, or scientific, persuasion and emotive persuasion lie a variety of 
methods for inducing justified true belief that are rational though not rigorous or exact. This is the 
domain of practical reason.”); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 9 (2008) (arguing 
that the existence of judicial discretion “is a consequence of legalism’s inability in many cases to 
decide the outcome (or decide it tolerably . . . ), and the related difficulty, often impossibility, of 
verifying the correctness of the outcome, whether by its consequences or its logic”). Posner also stated 
that “legalist tools—including those most hallowed ones of reasoning by analogy and strictly 
interpreting statutes and constitutions—come up short: The first is empty and the second has, despite 
appearances, a large discretionary element.” Id. at 12. Additionally, he noted that “[l]egalists 
acknowledge that their methods cannot close the deal every time . . . . There are too many vague 
statutes and even vaguer constitutional provisions, statutory gaps and inconsistencies, professedly 
discretionary domains, obsolete and conflicting precedents, and factual aporias.” Id. at 47. 
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Similar changes are already underway in the humanities, where many 
scholars now stress that the subjective sense of beauty causes 
demonstrable changes in the brain. This immediately implies that realistic 
theories of text interpretation must consider the reading, aesthetics, and 
form of texts at least as much as the postmodern fixation on politics and 
culture.5 This Article similarly seeks a biologically accurate understanding 
of how lawyers write and interpret texts. That said, law poses special 
problems. The reason is that a successful legal theory, unlike literature, 
should point to a single best interpretation. This requires that experts reach 
reliably similar judgments, at least on average, regardless of the culture 
they were born into. This kind of universality is natural in the sciences: 
given that there can be only one truth in the physical world, humans’ 
Type 1 intuitions must similarly converge or they would not be useful. We 
argue that lawyers who spend their lives drafting documents to constrain 
an uncertain future will develop similarly convergent intuitions in any 
society where lawyering exists as a discernible activity. The surprise is 
that the Type 1 emotion of beauty is similarly universal for entirely 
subjective choices. For example, psychologists have shown that artists in 
small Japanese villages reliably make the same aesthetic judgments as 
American Ivy League experts. This implies that lawyers may have 
similarly aesthetic preferences for some doctrinal choices compared to 
others. 
This Article starts from these basic psychological facts to construct 
a positive theory of how Type 1 processes enter into legal reasoning, shape 
the subjective experience of law, and explain why lawyers from widely 
different backgrounds nevertheless tend to reach closely similar 
judgments. We then build on these insights to make specific policy 
recommendations and normative claims. In particular, the existence of 
universality implies that all lawyers share at least some common Type 1 
beliefs regardless of education and life experience. This gives new and 
much more precise grounds for believing the traditional claim that legal 
disputes can be decided in ways that are safely insulated from personal or 
political bias. 
We proceed as follows. Section I reviews historic attempts to locate 
law within the more general problem of text interpretation. Section II 
reviews what scientists have learned about Type 1 thought processes, 
including mounting evidence that they provide a reliable guide to truth in 
such fields as visual art, literature, physics, and mathematics. We also 
describe evidence for a modest universality whereby experts from widely 
different cultural and educational backgrounds often reach the same 
                                                     
 5. See PAUL B. ARMSTRONG, HOW LITERATURE PLAYS WITH THE BRAIN: THE NEUROSCIENCE 
OF READING AND ART 55 (2013). 
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aesthetic judgments. Section III presents evidence for Type 1 reasoning in 
law and traces how it enters doctrine to decide cases. Section IV surveys 
nineteenth century arguments that what we now call Type 1 reasoning 
should be embraced as a reliable guide to law. It also updates these theories 
to accommodate the more modest versions of universality that modern 
science has documented. Finally, it asks how the prevalence of Type 1 
thought frames lawyers’ everyday experience of practice. Section V asks 
how legal institutions amplify universality’s weak ex ante consensus to 
generate stable, predictable rules. Section VI extends these arguments to 
make policy recommendations. 
I. THE LAW-AND-LITERATURE DEBATE 
Since the 1980s, legal scholars debating the determinacy of legal 
texts have almost always grounded their arguments in literary theory. The 
resulting law-and-literature movement can be traced to Professor 
Levinson, who argued that humanities scholars could help lawyers 
establish a coherent “set of rules” for estimating the “hardness” of meaning 
against conflicting interpretations.6 This was both natural—legal 
documents are plainly texts—and practical. The advantage, according to 
Levinson, was that literary theory had long since moved beyond the law’s 
arid debate between legal realists, who stress the “reality of disagreement 
among equally competent speakers of the native language”7 and formalists 
“infatuate[ed] . . . with the possibility of a science of criticism.”8 Despite 
this, Levinson was not particularly hopeful, concluding with the gloomy 
assessment that attempts to find meaningful patterns in precedent remain 
“a supreme act of faith.”9 
Two years later, Professor Dworkin seconded Levinson’s claim that 
literary theory could help scholars escape law’s “flat distinction between 
description and evaluation.”10 But he also warned that these theories could 
make law less determinate, creating “hard cases” that judges would have 
to decide “as a question of political theory,” although he hoped that judges 
would choose these theories based on natural “fit” rather than personal 
politics.11 At least in retrospect, Dworkin’s decision to invoke the aesthetic 
                                                     
 6. See Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 373–406 (1982). 
 7. Id. at 379. 
 8. Id. at 380. 
 9. Id. at 402–03. 
 10. Ronald Dworkin, How Law is Like Literature, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146–77 (1985). 
 11. See id. at 160–61 (“There is, of course, no algorithm for deciding whether a particular 
interpretation sufficiently fits that history not to be ruled out . . . as a question of political theory.”). 
Dworkin also stated that “any particular judge’s theory of fit will often fail to produce a unique 
interpretation.” Id. at 161. 
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concept of “fit” was an early hint that Type 1 reasoning could limit 
discretion. 
At this point, literary critic Stanley Fish entered the debate. His most 
lasting contribution was to frame the problem in formally Type 2 terms as 
“a few basic questions in the philosophy of language.”12 He then added 
that an “interpretative community” could narrow the list of permissible 
meanings.13 However, this superficially attractive claim is empirically 
doubtful14 and, in any case, fails to supply the middle ground that Levinson 
and Dworkin had sought. On the one hand, it implied that an unelected 
elite would decide for everyone, a possibility that Levinson had rejected.15 
On the other hand, no one could say exactly how much narrowing would 
occur since this necessarily depended on who joined the community. This 
gap was particularly painful since the existence of just one conflicting 
interpretation could leave judges unconstrained. 
Watching the argument play out, Judge Posner protested that the law-
and-literature analogy had been misguided all along.16 Literature, he said, 
was aesthetic and profited from ambiguity. But law was different, and 
much more like everyday speech: “If a message is garbled . . . you try to 
glean from everything you know about [the sender] and the circumstances 
of the failed message what he might have meant . . . the correct analysis is 
an intentionalist one.”17 By comparison, the kinds of clever interpretive 
ambiguities that Fish and the legal realists celebrated were more 
“obtuse . . . than ingenious.”18 
Fish shot back that Posner’s attempt to create a special subcategory 
for legal texts changed nothing: after all, philosophy-of-language 
                                                     
 12. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE 
OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 1 (1989). 
 13. See id. at 143–60. 
 14. Fish is, of course, trivially correct if we choose to identify his “interpretive community” with 
the country’s 1.2 million practicing lawyers. Attorneys in the U.S., WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia. 
org/wiki/Attorneys_in_the_United_States [https://perma.cc/R95G-LTGA]. However, this number is 
far too large to place any useful limit on the number of viewpoints. Fish would presumably reply that 
professional hierarchies and social structures play a much bigger role in defining which opinions are 
respectable. But there is almost no empirical evidence on how much narrowing actually happens, 
suggesting that the mechanism might well be too weak to matter. 
 15. See Levinson, supra note 6, at 384 (While one can appeal to “Kuhnian communities” of 
shared conventions, we should be “acutely aware of the contingency of such judgements.”). Fish 
himself seemed to welcome such power, arguing that literary theory “might play a role in altering the 
way in which the legal world is constructed by altering the way in which legal actors conceive of their 
activities.” FISH, supra note 12, at 308. 
 16. See POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 4, at 240. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 242. Posner’s specific ire was directed to a hypothetical argument that the Constitution 
did not literally require presidents to be 35 years old, but only have “the maturity and station in life of 
an average 35 year old.” Id. 
136 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 42:129 
arguments applied to all texts whatsoever.19 Formally, this bit of Type 2 
logic was irreproachable. All the same, Posner had a point. While 
philosophy-of-language arguments showed that variant interpretations 
were possible, they said nothing at all about which ones were likely. This 
created a deep conflict with the nearly universal perception that some legal 
and also literary interpretations are enormously better than others.20 This 
mattered, Posner explained, since narrowing the analysis to “better” 
readings could usefully “box in” judges’ discretion even when some 
ambiguity remained.21 
Thirty years later, legal scholars continue to wrestle with essentially 
the same arguments.22 In the meantime, literary theory has begun moving 
beyond narrow philosophy-of-language approaches to consider empirical 
evidence that humans’ response to reading produces measurable changes 
in the brain.23 This suggests that texts matter, rebutting accusations that 
literature is merely the “constructed handmaiden of sociopolitical 
power.”24 But in that case, it is also reasonable to ask whether Type 1 
processes favor some textual interpretations compared to others. 
Remarkably, recent science strongly supports this conjecture. 
II. THE SCIENCE 
Critics have cited the subjective emotion of beauty as evidence for 
an underlying unity in how humans understand painting, music, literature, 
and the other “sister arts” since the eighteenth century.25 However, the 
                                                     
 19. FISH, supra note 12, at 303–04 (rejecting Posner’s distinction because interpretation is 
“indistinguishable from what you think, in advance, the text is for and also from what you take to be 
your relation to it.”) (emphasis in original). 
 20. ARMSTRONG, supra note 5, at 9 (“The fact that interpreters may have interesting, productive 
disputes about textual meaning does not prevent agreement among practitioners whose authority has 
been accredited in various ways that some interpretations are less credible than others . . . .”); 
Levinson, supra note 6, at 384 (In law, not even “radical critics defend the position that any 
interpretation is as good as any other.”). 
 21. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 4, at 13 (explaining that even pragmatist judges are 
“boxed in, as other judges are, by . . . [factors including] a due regard for the integrity of the written 
word in contracts and statutes”). 
 22. For two recent contributions, see, e.g., Mark Kingwell, Let’s Ask Again: Is the Law Like 
Literature, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 317, 317–52 (1994); James Seaton, Law and Literature: Works, 
Theory, and Criticism, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 479, 479–07 (1999). 
 23. See, e.g., Nancy Easterlin, Review: How Literature Plays With the Brain, 39 PHILOSOPHY & 
LITERATURE 1, 267–70 (2015). 
 24. Id. at 267. 
 25. See G. GABRIELLE STARR, FEELING BEAUTY: THE NEUROSCIENCE OF AESTHETIC 
EXPERIENCE 4 (2013) (“Most theories of the Sister Arts have focused resolutely and explicitly on the 
subjective dimensions of response.”). Starr also stated that “the idea that there is a single autonomous 
domain in which we might discuss or reason about the visual arts, literature, music, imagination, 
beauty, the sublime, or even the vulgarly awful is an invention of the eighteenth century.” Id. at xii–
xiii. 
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same perception also occurs in objective subjects like mathematics26 and 
physics27 along with a wide variety of mundane tasks.28 Probably the most 
instructive example is chess, where masters learn to use Type 1 reasoning 
to identify the most important and creative possibilities with a single 
glance.29 Such examples argue that unconscious intuition is not just 
aesthetic, but also plays a key role in practical problem-solving. 
The outlines of what we now call Type 1 thought were already clear 
by 1821. That year, the poet and political radical Percy Bysshe Shelley 
wrote a celebrated essay contrasting “reason,” which he argued was 
limited to “algebraical relations” between known thoughts,30 with a second 
faculty of “imagination” that was alone capable of making other thoughts 
from existing ones,31 and deploying them “according to a certain rhythm 
and order which may be called the beautiful and the good.”32 Anticipating 
Freud by half a century, he went on to link imagination with what we now 
call the unconscious.33 Less convincingly, Shelley also anticipated Jung 
by claiming that aesthetic insights were universal, originating in the mind 
of God.34 
Two centuries of scientific research have refined and formalized 
these insights. Today, the characteristic Type 1 operations specialize in 
pattern recognition and the mental processes variously called “judgment,” 
                                                     
 26. Bertrand Russell, The Study of Mathematics, in MYSTICISM AND LOGIC AND OTHER ESSAYS 
60 (3d ed. 1976) (“[M]athematics, rightly viewed, possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty.”); see 
also Vicky Neal, Mathematics is Beautiful (No, Really), THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 17, 2017), 
http://theconversation.com/mathematics-is-beautiful-no-really-72921[https://perma.cc/GR8N-E258]. 
 27. P.A.M. Dirac, The Relation Between Mathematics and Physics, 59 PROC. R. SOC. 
EDINBURGH 1, 122–29 (1939) (arguing that workers seeking the fundamental laws of nature “should 
strive mainly for mathematical beauty”), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e69a/466c2576a4de2e77dd 
7bcb77c1f2ad5b2d6d.pdf [https://perma.cc/JC7R-2MQZ]. See generally FRANK WILCZEK, A 
BEAUTIFUL QUESTION: FINDING NATURE’S DEEP DESIGN (2015) (documenting use of “beautiful 
thoughts” in constructing scientific theories from Pythagoras to particle physics). Significantly, 
physicists’ subjective experience of beauty is classically Type 1: in Dirac’s phrase, it “cannot be 
defined, any more than beauty in art can be defined[.]” Dirac, supra, at 122–29. 
 28. KAHNEMAN, supra note 2, at 236–37 (Firefighters can intuit exactly when a house will 
collapse without knowing how they do it.). 
 29. See id. at 238–39. 
 30. Percy Bysshe Shelley, A Defence of Poetry or Remarks Suggested by an Essay Entitled “The 
Four Ages of Poetry,” in SHELLEY’S POETRY AND PROSE 480 (1977). The essay first appeared 
posthumously in PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY, ESSAYS, LETTERS FROM ABROAD, TRANSLATIONS AND 
FRAGMENTS (1840). 
 31. Shelley, supra note 30, at 480; see also id. at 503 (Imagination allows humans to create “new 
materials of knowledge, and power, and pleasure.”). 
 32. Id. at 503. 
 33. Id. at 506 (The poetic imagination “differs from logic, that it is not subject to the controul of 
the active powers of the mind, and that its birth and recurrence have no necessary connexion with the 
consciousness or will.”). 
 34. Id. at 485 (Aesthetics are defined “as existing in the mind of the creator, which is itself the 
image of all other minds.”). 
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“intuition,” and “aesthetics.”35 These are very unlike the brain’s alternative 
Type 2 thought process, variously called “reason” and “logic.”36 The 
hallmark of the latter is that it can be articulated, reduced to unambiguous 
instructions and, as Alan Turing predicted, implemented by machines.37 
Crucially, much of the best evidence remains subjective: Type 1 and Type 
2 methods simply feel different. For example, aesthetic reasoning is 
routinely described as unconscious, automatic, and having little sense of 
effort or control.38 This means that even when we recognize a pattern, we 
often cannot say why. Sometimes the mind’s logical, Type 2 methods can 
replicate the insight, sometimes they can’t.39 
The next Section reviews what scientists have learned about the 
nature of Type 1 judgments, focusing on the surprising result that artists 
from different societies often make the same aesthetic judgments, 
regardless of the cultures that they were born into. 
A. Type Intuition: Aesthetics and Fast Thinking 
Professor Armstrong argues that Type 1 reasoning enters reading 
through the “recognition of patterns.”40 This implies that readers move 
both upward (by assembling details into overall patterns) and downward 
(by using the overall pattern to make sense of details).41 From this 
standpoint, legal reasoning—which consists almost entirely of finding and 
                                                     
 35. See generally CARLOS E. PEREZ, ARTIFICIAL INTUITION: THE IMPROBABLE DEEP LEARNING 
REVOLUTION (2018). 
 36. Id. at 96. 
 37. See Turing Machine, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_machine [https:// 
perma.cc/PH3J-H985]. Turing’s logic was nicely anticipated by the poet W.B. Yeats, who noticed 
after refusing a political debate 
that all the arguments which had occurred to me earlier were said by somebody or other. 
Logic is a machine; one can leave it to itself, and unhelped it will force those present to 
exhaust the subject. The fool is as likely as the sage to speak the appropriate answer to any 
assertion. If an argument is forgotten, someone will go home miserable. You throw your 
money on the table, and you receive so much change. 
BARRY SHIELS, W.B. YEATS AND WORLD LITERATURE: THE SUBJECT OF POETRY 166 (2015) (quoting 
Yeats’ 1908 journal entry). 
 38. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 2, at 20. 
 39. Remarkably, the dichotomy between logic and pattern recognition also applies to machines. 
Computers built around human-supplied Type 2 logic are wonderful at arithmetic but do a terrible job 
of recognizing patterns. Conversely, “neural network” architectures that learn by interacting with the 
environment have the opposite problem: they are good at recognizing patterns but incapable of long 
division. PEREZ, supra note 35, at 96. 
 40. ARMSTRONG, supra note 5, at 58. 
 41. Id. at 54–55. Armstrong provides a detailed description of this dynamic, which he calls the 
“hermeneutic spiral.” Id. The key insight is that interpretation requires “the reciprocal construction of 
an overall order and its constituent parts, the overarching arrangement making sense of the details by 
their relation to one another, even as their configuration only emerges as the parts fit together.” Id. at 
54. This leads to characteristic “to-and-fro adjustments, between the details of the work and the 
configurations one expects (and may or may not find).” Id. at 55. 
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comparing patterns across different levels of text42—is just one example 
of how the brain uses its exquisitely refined pattern-spotting circuits to 
make sense of the world. 
1. Brain Imaging 
We have already said that the perception of beauty has been reported 
not just for art, but also for mathematics, physics, and a wide variety of 
practical tasks. The advent of brain imaging has given this subjective claim 
a physical basis in the brain. So far, most of this work has concentrated on 
mapping regions that respond to visual art.43 However, images of the 
brain’s aesthetic responses to music44 and mathematics45 turn out to be 
closely similar. 
The more general lesson is that the images hint—however 
coarsely46—at how thought can be identified with physical structures in 
the brain. This viewpoint is particularly natural for Type 1 reasoning, 
which can be convincingly described as a process of “wiring” neurons 
together into “circuits” that have been optimized to detect specific 
patterns. Whereas most sensations are simply noise,47 coherent patterns 
stimulate the brain’s pleasure centers by confirming existing neural 
connections and forming new ones.48 This has obvious survival value in a 
world where it is important both to exploit previously-discovered patterns 
and to consider new ones. 
                                                     
 42. See infra Section IV. 
 43. STARR, supra note 25, at 34 (“The first neuroscientists interested in aesthetics were primarily 
concerned with visual art, for vision, as the sense most accessible to behavioral evaluation, has been 
the most robustly understood area of perception.”). 
 44. S.E. Trehub, Human Processing Predispositions and Musical Universals, in THE ORIGINS 
OF MUSIC 427–28 (2000); STARR, supra note 25, at 48; Tomohiro Ishizu & Semir Zeki, Toward a 
Brain-Based Theory of Beauty, 6 PLOS ONE 7, 42 (2011) (Aesthetic reactions to music and painting 
produce effects in areas of the brain that are involved with emotion processing, although the data “do 
not preclude subtle differences in the timing of neural activity.”). 
 45. S. Zeki, J.P. Romaya, D.M.T. Benincasa & M.F. Atiyah, The Experience of Mathematical 
Beauty and Its Neural Correlates, FRONTIERS IN HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE, Feb. 2014, at 1, 10 (finding 
a “very close” though “not perfect” correspondence for mathematical, musical, and visual beauty in 
the same regions of the brain). 
 46. For the foreseeable future, the images are too crude to identify individual neurons, or resolve 
the millisecond-by-millisecond changes that drive brain function. ARMSTRONG, supra note 5, at 4; see 
also Keith Sawyer, Brain Imaging: What Good Is It? Brain Imaging Promises Much, but Offers Little 
(At Least, so Far), PSYCHOL. TODAY (Oct. 21, 2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/ 
zig-zag/201310/brain-imaging-what-good-is-it [https://perma.cc/EUV2-AAND]. 
 47. ARMSTRONG, supra note 5, at 15 (“Harmony and dissonance in art are defined not only by 
each other but also by their opposition to a third concept—noise . . . . The human brain’s capacities 
for synthesis are not unlimited . . . . Some stimuli simply are not noticed. If they are perceived but 
cannot be processed, they are noise.”). 
 48. Id. at 50 (“There is interesting experimental evidence that the making and breaking of 
neuronal connections stimulates the expression of neurotransmitters strongly associated with pleasure 
in ways that no doubt affect aesthetic experiences.”). 
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The brain’s other characteristic strategy is to recycle established 
circuits for new tasks.49 But in that case, reasoning for the new purpose 
remains hostage to maintaining the original function—a brain that uses the 
same circuits for tort law and crossing the street will stop improving the 
former when it compromises safety. This suggests that we may sometimes 
find ourselves locked into certain perceptions, although the brain often 
finds workarounds.50 
2. Neural Networks 
Finally, our understanding of Type 1 pattern recognition has been 
deeply influenced by artificial intelligence research. While neural network 
computers do not claim to duplicate actual brain architectures, they 
nevertheless show what happens when large numbers of neuron-like 
(multiple input, non-linear response) circuits are wired together to find 
patterns.51 Unlike traditional approaches based on Type 2 logic supplied 
by humans, neural networks learn by trial-and-error, constantly rewiring 
themselves to make pattern detection more efficient.52 But while they 
sometimes make predictions that no human can duplicate, their reasoning 
often cannot be articulated or even understood by us. Indeed, some make 
predictions that no human can duplicate.53 What makes this strange is that 
every neural network can be formally reduced to a set of linear algebra 
                                                     
 49. Reading short stories activates the same regions that the reader would use if they were 
performing, imagining, or observing the protagonist’s actions in real life. Nicole K. Speer, Jeremy R. 
Reynolds, Khena M. Swallow & Jeffrey M. Zacks, Reading Stories Activates Neural Representations 
of Visual and Motor Experiences, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 989 (2009). 
 50. ARMSTRONG, supra note 5, at 36–37 (Girl whose normal left brain region for recognizing 
letters had been damaged was able to develop the mirror image right brain region for the same 
purpose.). 
 51. PEREZ, supra note 35. Readers can build intuition about how neural networks work by 
reading Anderson’s lucid, albeit rigorous account of the so-called “Perceptron” machines built in the 
1950s. JAMES A. ANDERSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO NEURAL NETWORKS (1995). The basic 
architecture featured three types of element: Sensors (S) which detect signals from the external world, 
Associative Cells (A) that are wired to multiple sensors to detect simple patterns (e.g. lines, triangles) 
and Relational Cells (R) that are wired to multiple A cells to detect higher-order patterns like houses 
or fire trucks. Crucially, the A and R cells exhibit “threshold,” i.e. only fire when incoming signals 
exceed some predetermined value. The machine then evolves to maximize the probability that one and 
only one R cell will fire when the desired pattern appears. This is done by rewiring the connections 
between the A and R cells each time detection fails. Specifically, A cells that sent out a positive signal 
produce a higher output the next time, while A cells that sent out a negative signal have their strength 
reduced. This makes it more likely that the relevant R cell will guess right next time. Id. at 220. The 
same basic architecture can also be modified to solve more abstract problems, for example creating 
categories that parsimoniously distinguish different types of events. Id. at 209–38. 
 52. See Fabio Ciucci, AI and Deep Learning, Simply Explained, KD NUGGETS (July 2017) 
(Neural network program trained on data from 700,000 patients can predict schizophrenia onset better 
than humans.), https://www.kdnuggets.com/2017/07/ai-deep-learning-explained-simply.html [https:// 
perma.cc/2EAV-BSLC]. 
 53. Id. 
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equations.54 Despite its formal clarity, the mathematics is much too 
complicated for our Type 2 selves to understand.55 
B. Universality 
Philosophy-of-language arguments have difficulty explaining why 
one interpretation should be better than any other. An improved theory 
must add assumptions that break this symmetry. Fish’s suggestion of an 
elite interpretive community is one (unpalatable) way to do this. This 
Article starts from different evidence showing that certain judgments are 
universal, i.e. that human experts often make the same Type 1 choices no 
matter what culture they were born into. Crucially, this universality 
implies that experts from any one country share common ground no matter 
how much they disagree about culture and politics. 
1. Objective Problems 
The idea that Type 1 perceptions in fields like physics or 
mathematics are universal seems entirely reasonable. Type 1 methods are, 
after all, optimized to spot patterns. In fields where the physical world 
defines a single truth, any sense of beauty which reliably points to that 
truth must similarly converge on a unique pattern. For example, we would 
expect aliens who evolved on other planets to arrive at much the same 
understanding of physics that we have.56 Probably the best-studied 
example of how external reality forces convergence comes from studying 
how humans from widely separate cultures interpret random ink blots 
(“Rorschach patterns”) as people, animals, or insects. Of the thirteen most 
popular responses found in North America, nine appear to be universal, 
meaning that they elicit similar responses at similar rates across Europe,57 
                                                     
 54. Id. (Machine learning “computations are visible, but too many to make a human-readable 
summary.”); Sean Captain, We Don’t Always Know What AI is Thinking—And That Can Be Scary, 
FAST COMPANY (Nov. 15, 2016) (quoting IBM’s Cognitive Computing Officer: “It’s not clear even 
from a technical perspective that every aspect of AI algorithms can be understood by humans”), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/3064368/we-dont-always-know-what-ai-is-thinking-and-that-can-be-
scary [https://perma.cc/VS3B-685E]. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See, e.g., RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, FERNANDO B. MORINGO & WILLIAM G. WAGNER, THE 
FEYNMAN LECTURES ON GRAVITATION 2 (1995) et passim (arguing that Venusian physicists would 
eventually discover gravity even if clouds made the stars invisible). 
 57. Anne Andronikov-Sanglade, Use of the Rorschach Comprehensive System in Europe: State 
of the Art, in HANDBOOK OF CROSS-CULTURAL AND MULTICULTURAL PERSONALITY ASSESSMENTS 
338–39 (2000) (reporting French data); see Eugenia V. Vinet, The Rorschach Comprehensive System 
in Iberoamerica, in HANDBOOK OF CROSS-CULTURAL AND MULTICULTURAL PERSONALITY 
ASSESSMENTS 347–49 (2000) (reporting data for Spain and Portugal). 
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Japan,58 and Latin America.59 As Professor Weiner remarks, this 
universality follows from the fact that alternative interpretations would 
require “a substantial distortion or misrepresentation.”60 In these cases, at 
least, “[t]he boundaries between realistic and unrealistic perception are 
universal and not culture bound.”61 
2. Aesthetic Convergence 
The harder question is whether purely aesthetic responses can be 
similarly universal. Psychologists first proposed experiments to probe how 
humans make aesthetic judgments in the 1870s.62 However, early 
researchers soon reported that average people do not share aesthetic 
judgments across cultures.63 This finding seems to have discouraged 
further research until Professor Irvin L. Child took a second look in the 
1960s.64 While Child confirmed that lay opinion does indeed depend on 
culture, this was not true for experts. 
Child’s method depended on asking native artists to compare similar 
paintings. In each case, American experts had overwhelmingly agreed that 
one design was aesthetically superior to the other.65 In his most famous 
study, Child showed pairs of both abstract and representational paintings 
to thirty-six Japanese potters in small rural villages. They agreed with 
American Ivy League experts 63% of the time. Significantly, the odds of 
this happening by chance were less than one percent.66 By comparison, the 
same Ivy League experts’ chances of agreeing with a Connecticut high 
school student were just 47%—indistinguishable from a simple coin 
toss.67 Child and his coauthors went on to document similar results for 
                                                     
 58. IRVING B. WEINER, PRINCIPLES OF RORSCHACH INTERPRETATION 52 (2d ed. 2003) 
(reporting Japanese data). 
 59. Vinet, supra note 57, at 350–52 (reporting data for Chile, Brazil, and Venezuela). 
 60. WEINER, supra note 58, at 53. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Gustav Fechner proposed, but did not implement, an experimental agenda to explore the 
psychology of aesthetics in the 1870s. See Irvin L. Child & Rosaline S. Schwartz, Exposure to Better 
and Poorer Art, 2 J. AESTHETIC EDUC. 111, 118 (1968). 
 63. Irvin L. Child & Leon Siroto, BaKwele and American Esthetic Evaluations Compared, 4 
ETHNOLOGY 349, 350 (1965). 
 64. Id. at 349 (collecting pre-Sixties literature and concluding that psychologists had tried 
experimental tests of aesthetic relativity “to an astonishingly small degree”). Child taught his 
introductory psychology class to me and several hundred other Yale freshmen in 1975. 
 65. Id. at 350. Child took great pains to test experts who had never been exposed to Western 
culture—a process much easier in the 1960s than it is today. 
 66. Sumiko Iwao & Irvin L. Child, Comparison of Esthetic Judgments by American Experts and 
by Japanese Potters, 68 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 27, 30 (1966). 
 67. Id. at 32. 
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isolated communities in Japan,68 Fiji,69 West Africa,70 Ecuador, Peru, and 
Puerto Rico.71 Subsequent studies have generally confirmed these 
findings72 but added little beyond trying to localize universality in 
particular parts of the image.73 
Child’s universality only occurs in specific circumstances. First, it is 
limited to humans (“experts”) who have spent large parts of their lives 
making aesthetic choices. Second, the effect is modest, just 10% more than 
a coin toss. This makes it nearly invisible in everyday life unless and until 
humans organize surveys to look for it. Third, Child’s method uses similar 
images and therefore makes no claim to large choices, say that a Picasso 
painting has more aesthetic value than an African folk mask. 
3. Origins 
It is natural to ask what causes universality. Given that the effect only 
applies to experts, learning must play a role. This immediately rules out 
explanations in which evolution has hardwired aesthetic preferences 
directly into the brain. Instead, Child argued that artists learn by 
contemplation, independently discovering “similar facts about the 
adequacy of particular works for satisfying aesthetic interests.”74 
                                                     
 68. A subsequent study tested Japanese subjects from seven additional crafts including flower 
arranging, tea ceremony, and textile dying. Sumiko Iwao, Irvin L. Child & Miguel Garcia, Further 
Evidence of Agreement Between Japanese and American Esthetic Evaluations, 18 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 
11, 15 (1969). 
 69. C.S. Ford, E. Terry Prothro & Irvin L. Child, Some Transcultural Comparisons of Esthetic 
Judgment, 68 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 19, 26 (1966) (Six subjects agreed with American experts 78% of the 
time; significant at the one percent level.). The authors also found a similar trend among four craftsmen 
from the Greek Islands, but this was statistically insignificant. Id. at 23–25. 
 70. Child & Siroto, supra note 63, at 351. The agreement on African masks was significant at 
the one percent level. 
 71. See Irvin L. Child, The Psychological Meaning of Aesthetic Judgments, in VISUAL ARTS 
RESEARCH 53 (1983) (describing three small Latin American studies). 
 72. Julian P. Renoult, The Evolution of Aesthetics: A Review of Models, in AESTHETICS AND 
NEUROSCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC AND ARTISTIC PERSPECTIVES 282 (Zoï Kapoula & Marine Vernet eds., 
2016) (“Many subsequent studies have concurred with this view that aesthetic preferences and beauty 
are, at least in part, universal and innate.”). One recent study shows that art students are much more 
likely than lay audiences to choose abstract paintings by professional painters over similar works by 
children and animals. Though seemingly unaware of Child’s work, their result neatly reproduces his 
strong distinction between experts and lay audiences. See Angelina Hawley-Dolan & Ellen Winner, 
Seeing the Mind Behind the Art: People Can Distinguish Abstract Expressionist Paintings From 
Highly Similar Paintings by Children, Chimps, Monkeys, and Elephants, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 435, 440 
(2011). 
 73. The strategy is particularly tempting in an era when computers make it easy to decompose 
images into mathematically precise “Fourier” and “Power Spectra” components. See, e.g., Renoult, 
supra note 72, at 282; Wilfried van Damme, Universality and Cultural Particularity in Visual 
Aesthetics, in BEING HUMANS: ANTHROPOLOGICAL UNIVERSALITY AND PARTICULARITY IN 
TRANSDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 258 (Neil Roughley ed., 2000). 
 74. Child & Siroto, supra note 63, at 33. 
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However, this still left the question of what generates these underlying 
“aesthetic interests” to begin with. This was probably unanswerable in the 
1960s. Today, however, we know that the brain’s pleasure centers reward 
us for forming new neural connections and using old ones.75 In this view, 
art is a form of play designed to question our established views of the 
world and try out new ones. 
For now at least, Child’s hypothesis is not the only possibility. 
Aesthetic convergence could also be driven by a self-selection effect in 
which certain personality types preferentially become potters. In principle, 
this can be checked by testing how peoples’ aesthetic responses change 
before and after they become experts, although little work has been done 
in this area.76 
4. Education and Socialization 
Child showed that students could be taught to improve their test 
scores by simulating taste, i.e. guessing what experts would say.77 
However, scores rose faster when instructors focused on showing students 
how to appreciate art and asked for sincere (unsimulated) responses.78 
Significantly, Child taught this aesthetic sense using the traditional 
methods of art criticism, i.e. giving students Type 1, non-algorithmic hints 
about what to look for.79 
Child’s universality research was limited to art. However, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the sense of beauty in physics similarly flows from 
prolonged contemplation without any need for special education or 
indoctrination. As the physicist P.A.M. Dirac remarked, people who study 
mathematics “usually have no trouble in appreciating [beauty].”80 
                                                     
 75. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 5, at 48–49. 
 76. Child and Schwartz did perform a small-scale experiment which asked nineteen students to 
examine paired images for eight hours apiece. While they found no evidence of learning, this was not 
surprising. Child’s artists had invested orders of magnitude more time making aesthetic choices. Child 
& Schwartz, supra note 62. 
 77. Id. at 112 (School children who had been told which images experts preferred could be taught 
to distinguish “fairly well” which art was considered “better.”). 
 78. Irvin L. Child & Rosaline S. Schwartz, Exploring the Teaching of Art Values, 1 J. AESTHETIC 
EDUC. 41 (1966). 
 79. Child found that students made “impressive” progress when he showed them seven 
principles, each illustrated with pairs that did and did not follow the suggested advice. Id. at 51. Child’s 
principles were selectivity, organization, consistency, variety, aliveness, use of decoration, and 
appropriate use of elements. Id. at 50–51. These cryptic labels were explained through detailed—but 
far from algorithmic—definitions which demand further judgment from the reader. For example, Child 
defined “Use of Decoration” as follows: “Good decoration must suit the object. It must not ‘fight’ with 
the object as a whole in line, color, textures, shapes, or forms. Good decoration must seem an essential 
part of the object or work of art and not look ‘stuck on’ as an afterthought. Good decoration does not 
ask attention for itself but permits the entire object or work of art to remain most important.” Id. 
 80. Dirac, supra note 27, at 122–23. Mathematician Vicki Neal similarly stresses the central 
importance of contemplation in learning to appreciate beauty: 
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III. TYPE 1 THINKING IN LAW 
It is clear that Type 1 insights play a significant role in fields ranging 
from the visual arts to mathematics. However, the relative importance of 
Type 1 and Type 2 processes varies dramatically by discipline. This makes 
it natural to see law as an intermediate case along a continuum between art 
(principally Type 1) to science (mostly Type 2). This Section collects 
evidence for Type 1 reasoning in law and traces the specific mechanisms 
that let it decide particular cases.81 
A. The Subjective Experience of Law 
Legal realism’s most notorious failing is that it ignores how lawyers 
actually practice and experience law.82 Yet subjective experience was 
historically the first and most important clue that common brain functions 
were at work in fields from painting to physics. This makes it natural to 
look for similar evidence of Type 1 thinking in lawyering’s most basic and 
defining function: writing. 
1. Writing 
Non-legal writing is already deeply entangled with Type 1 thought. 
This is evident from, among other things, the fact that finding the right 
words is largely unconscious, brings pleasure, and is almost never 
                                                     
I cannot find a piece of mathematics beautiful unless I first understand it properly—and 
that means it can take a while for me to appreciate the aesthetic qualities. 
 I don’t think this unique to mathematics. There are pieces of music, buildings, pieces 
of visual art where I have not at first appreciated their beauty or elegance—and it is only 
by persevering, by grappling with the ideas, that I have come to perceive the beauty. 
 For me, one of the joys of teaching undergraduates is watching them develop their 
own appreciation of the beauty of mathematics. 
Neal, supra note 26. 
 81. Brain imaging researchers have yet to investigate legal reasoning. However, the relevant 
techniques are being developed, most notably in experiments that image subjects’ brains in real time 
as they proceed through short stories. Speer, Reynolds, Swallow & Zacks, supra note 49. The 
additional difficulty for law is that asking subjects to make aesthetic choices for concepts like 
“nonobviousness” requires so much education that they could be inadvertently socialized to give 
particular answers. One workaround would be to look for universality in self-contained documents 
like contracts. 
 82. As Prof. Solum remarks, 
[F]rom a perspective internal to the law, the claim that judging is politics all the way down 
seems absurd, because it fails to account for the phenomenology of judging. Judges, 
lawyers, and legal scholars do not experience legal decisionmaking as the exercise of 
discretion based on politics. This point is actually common ground between legal scholars 
as diverse as Professor Ronald Dworkin, who believed that there was a legally correct 
outcome in every dispute, and Professor Duncan Kennedy, who defends the view that law 
is deeply political. 
Lawrence B. Solum, The Positive Foundations of Formalism: False Necessity and American Legal 
Realism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2473–74 (2014) (book review). 
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reducible to Type 2 algorithms. That said, we seldom stop to realize just 
how much work Type 1 processes do. Consider this deceptively simple 
phrase: “A lovely little old rectangular green French silver whittling 
knife.”83 Move a single word and you immediately see that something has 
gone badly wrong. Yet no one ever taught you an explicit Type 2 rule, and 
figuring it out is tedious84—so tedious in fact that you begin to wonder 
how the mind manages to write whole chapters and books. Sometimes this 
process is purely aesthetic. But it also extends to knowing one’s audience 
and how best to communicate. 
2. Legal Writing 
It is difficult to generalize about how writing’s Type 1 content 
changes when the focus shifts to law. On the one hand, legal documents 
can be highly algorithmic, most notably in architecting elaborately 
interlocking definitions and borrowed terms of art. At the same time, they 
also pose Type 1 problems that lay writing does not. The characteristic 
lawyering activity is writing rules—for example, legislation, bilateral 
contracts, and court opinions—that will be interpreted by strangers to 
decide disputes that are only imperfectly anticipated. While there are better 
and worse ways to do this, they all depend on reducing massive amounts 
of life experience to Type 1 insights. But once lawyers learn to write, it is 
only natural that their brains will commandeer the same circuits to 
interpret what other lawyers mean. Like Child’s potters, the artist becomes 
the critic. Finally, the circle closes with lawyers recycling their interpretive 
experience to improve their drafting. 
All of this makes lawyers different from the average educated 
layman. For us, writing is an installment in what Dworkin saw as an 
endless chain of documents.85 It is not enough to memorialize the present; 
we must also consider how our words could change the interpretation of 
earlier documents and facilitate accidental or deliberate misunderstanding 
in the future.86 
                                                     
 83. MARK FORSYTH, THE ELEMENTS OF ELOQUENCE: SECRETS OF THE PERFECT TURN OF 
PHRASE (2013). 
 84. English adjective/noun combinations are invariably ordered opinion-size-age-shape-color-
origin-material-purpose-noun. Id. 
 85. See Dworkin, supra note 10, at 158–62. 
 86. The depth of these professional instincts is most visible when lawyers collaborate with 
educated lay people. For the past few years I have worked with academic biologists to screen proposed 
experiments against so-called “ethical, legal, and social implications.” Given that our opinions are 
preserved with an eye to publication, the overall purpose closely resembles a common law court. Yet 
my lay colleagues seldom see this. Some offer explanations that “prove too much” by facially 
invalidating large swathes of federal law, or else framing rules that would allow almost any future 
experiment to go forward. Others give opaque explanations that say almost nothing about what the 
panel would accept next time. And still others propose fact tests that would be difficult or impossible 
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3. Universality 
We have argued that scientific intuitions converge because there is 
only one physical world. We cannot know whether there is some similarly 
uniquely best way to write legal documents. But if there is, there cannot 
be many, and we should expect practitioners to converge on similar 
lessons in any society where “lawyering” is a discernible activity. In the 
modern world this arguably includes every nation on earth.87 
The deeper question is whether universality goes beyond these 
shared experiences. Child’s work suggests that we should expect aesthetic 
intuition to operate even when the experience of lawyering teaches no life 
lessons at all. The joy which many formalists take in verbal gymnastics 
points strongly in this direction.88 
4. Normative Implications 
The existence of universality across countries necessarily implies 
that lawyers within any one country share common ground about how to 
interpret legal documents. Furthermore, this ground must exist despite the 
deep conflicts over values and goals that all societies face. This makes any 
standards based on this common ground completely democratic, at least if 
we assume that laypeople would agree with the experts given sufficient 
time and study. 
This normative argument is sufficiently important that we should 
worry about possible loopholes. The first is empirical. Pending further 
research, universality could still turn out to be a selection effect, i.e. that 
legal careers attract people whose values are systematically different from 
average humans. In that case, agreed standards among lawyers would not 
represent the broader society after all. Second, assuming that universality 
is learned, its lessons cannot be broader than the experience of lawyering 
                                                     
to implement in practice. My point is not that I handle these issues better than my colleagues, though 
I think I do. Rather, it is that they do not see these pitfalls in the first place. 
 87. But see James Pearson, North Korea’s Only Foreign-Founded Law Firm Suspends 
Operations, REUTERS (July 31, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-lawyer/north-
koreas-only-foreign-founded-law-firm-suspends-operations-idUSKCN10C1A1 [https://perma.cc/ 
K6PE-J9DS] (reporting that “most” of North Korea’s 8,000 lawyers work for the state). 
 88. Consider, for example, Federal Circuit Chief Judge Helen Nies’ argument that the tests for 
patent law’s “non-obviousness” and “substantiality” requirements should be identical. Roton Barrier, 
Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Nies, J., concurring). This made little 
sense from a policy or statutory interpretation perspective, since legal standards that address distinct 
economic problems should normally be independent of one another. See Ted O’Donoghue, Suzanne 
Scotchmer & Jacques-François Thisse, Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological 
Progress, 7 J. OF ECONS. AND MGMT. STRATEGY 1 (1998) (analyzing optimal pairings of “non-
obviousness” and “substantiality” standards for different industries). But it did let Nies argue that “[a] 
substitution in the patented invention cannot be both nonobvious and insubstantial.” Roton Barrier, 
79 F.3d at 1128. Here at least, the pleasure of an attractive syllogism seems to have outweighed all 
other considerations. 
148 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 42:129 
itself. This probably includes a bias toward focusing on the rights and 
goals of individuals. This could sometimes slant legal reasoning toward, 
say, capitalist values compared to socialist ones. 
B. Mechanics: Finding Alternative Patterns 
The question remains just how Type 1 intuition enters legal 
reasoning to decide cases. Unlike most of the existing literature,89 we 
decline the (likely impossible) task of reducing legal judgment to 
completely determinate, Type 2 rules. This Section emphasizes how legal 
research uses Type 1 methods to find new patterns within legal texts. 
Suppose that you represent a client and that your opponent has cited 
some rule that establishes liability. In the physical world there can only be 
one truth, ensuring that every pattern must be consistent with every other 
pattern. Legal doctrine, on the other hand, is assembled piecemeal by 
many hands over time. This implies that patterns can and often will be 
inconsistent. The advocate’s job is to find a pattern that favors her client 
and persuade a court that this version is the attractive one.90 
There are basically three ways for legal researchers to develop 
patterns. First, the advocate can drill down into particular words and 
phrases, the same tactic that led Bill Clinton to argue, “It depends on what 
the meaning of the word ‘is’ is.”91 This is often fairly easy, since 
dictionaries invariably offer several synonyms for every definition, each 
of which recursively leads to still more definitions and synonyms. 
Second, acts that are forbidden by one rule may sometimes be 
authorized and even required by other bodies of law. Here, the main 
difficulty is to find a second rule broad enough to cover the behavior at 
issue.92 Sometimes this can be easy. For example, intellectual property 
gives recipients a “lawful monopoly,” while antitrust law holds that some 
(poorly-specified) business methods for exploiting patents are illegal. The 
                                                     
 89. For an exhaustive survey of the existing jurisprudence literature, see, e.g., Precedent and 
Analogy in Legal Reasoning, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June 20, 2006), https://plato.stanford. 
edu/entries/legal-reas-prec/. 
 90. Scholars have long recognized this incoherence, perhaps most famously in the so-called 
“canons of construction” for interpreting statutes. Professor Llewellyn famously argued that every 
canon has a counter-canon, so that judges end with the same discretion they had to begin with. Karl 
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or Canons About How 
Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). 
 91. Timothy Noah, Bill Clinton and the Meaning of “Is,” SLATE (Sept. 13, 1998), http:// 
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/chatterbox/1998/09/bill_clinton_and_the_meaning_ 
of_is.html [https://perma.cc/K2KU-2UMD]. 
 92. The potential for conflict grows when courts are permitted to include supplemental sources 
like common sense, custom, and public policy in their inquiry. See POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, 
supra note 4, at 287. One of formalism’s most appealing features is that it limits judges to legal texts, 
making it that much harder to find conflicts. 
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result is that there is no gray area: if you guess wrong you not only lose 
your intellectual property reward, you commit a felony.93 
Finally, advocates can step back to ask whether the proposed 
interpretation conflicts with the statute’s other provisions or overall 
purpose. Such inconsistencies are fairly common since no complex text is 
ever entirely consistent and most legislators are careless.94 More 
fundamentally, different sections may be drafted by different legislators 
with different intent, so that the overall statutory scheme may never have 
existed in any one mind at all. Then too, legislators cannot anticipate every 
fact pattern, so judges sometimes find themselves confronting what 
Professor Lessig calls “latent ambiguities”95 that no one anticipated. The 
Mann Act,96 RICO,97 and federal wire fraud98 are all examples of statutes 
that turned out to cover many more fact patterns than Congress anticipated. 
C. Legal Judgment: Choosing the Best Pattern 
We have argued that advocates who look hard enough will almost 
always find competing patterns. At this point, legal reasoning consists of 
picking the “best” or “most convincing” one. If law were a Type 2 activity, 
good lawyers could stand at a white board and demonstrate the right choice 
to everyone. But of course, this is precisely what they cannot do.99 Instead, 
the best they can do is point out qualitative reasons to choose their pattern 
in much the same way that art critics admire some works compared to 
others.100 American lawyers typically refer to these characteristically Type 
1 narratives as “judgment.” A legal realist would presumably call this a 
smokescreen. However, our “green knife” example argues that Type 1 
                                                     
 93. M.J. Adelman & F.K. Juenger, Patent-Antitrust: Patent Dynamics and Field-of-Use 
Licensing, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 308 (1975). 
94. Statutes and constitutions are written in haste by busy people not always of great ability 
or diligence, and we are not privileged to ignore the hasty and hackneyed provisions and 
reserve our attention for the greatest. Moreover, they are products of a committee (the 
legislature) rather than of a single mind, and of a committee whose numerous members 
may have divergent objectives . . . . To suppose that its every word probably has 
significance, that every statute is a seemless whole, misconceives the legislative process.  
POSNER, LAW & LITERATURE, supra note 4, at 248. 
 95. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 189 (2d ed. 2006). 
 96. Eric Weiner, The Long, Colorful History of the Mann Act, NPR (Mar. 11, 2008), https:// 
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=88104308. 
 97. Harold Selan, Interpreting RICO’s “Pattern of Racketeering Activity” Requirement After 
Sedima: Separate Schemes, Episodes or Related Acts?, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 1 (1987). 
 98. K. Edward Raleigh, Limiting Mail and Wire Fraud’s Scope, 31 CRIM. JUST. 30 (2017). 
 99. See, e.g., POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 4, at 287 (Logic is especially helpless 
in the face of “difficult and important cases.”). Id. at 286 (“[M]any legal questions cannot be resolved 
by logical or empirical demonstration. After eighty-two years it is impossible to prove that Lochner 
was decided wrongly.”). 
 100. Cf. id. at 288 (“But because the rational arguments of judges, like those of literary critics, 
fall short of being conclusive when the dispute is a difficult one to resolve by methods of reason.”). 
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thought often processes enormous amounts of data. Anecdotally, at least, 
most working lawyers seem to think that judgment conveys valuable 
information.101 
Education and Socialization 
Law-and-literature theorists often invoke “education” and 
“socialization” to inject democratic values into Fish’s otherwise elitist 
“interpretive community.” By comparison, universality argues for a 
humbler role in which education mostly points students to truths they 
would eventually discover anyway. As The Paper Chase’s Professor 
Kingsfield says, 
I call on you, ask you a question and you answer it. Why don’t I just 
give you a lecture? Because through my questions, you learn to teach 
yourselves. Through this method of questioning and answering, 
questioning, answering, we seek to develop in you the ability to 
analyze that vast complex set of facts that constitutes the relationships 
of members within a given society. Questioning and answering. At 
times you may feel that you have found the correct answer. I assure 
you that this is a total delusion on your part. You will never find the 
correct, absolute and final answer.102 
Conversely, universality should make us suspicious of more coercive 
approaches, for example the ferocity that first year law professors bring to 
instilling the doubtful103 idea that contract law is unthinkable without 
“consideration.”104 There is probably no great harm in this: given how 
many precedents would have to be uprooted to excise it, the fact that the 
concept could be changed is mostly theoretical. But we should worry that 
the same power could be used to slant legal judgments toward specific 
                                                     
 101. Levinson, supra note 6, at 384 (In law, not even “radical critics defend the position that any 
interpretation is as good as any other.”). 
 102. Quoted in Steven Adelman, Transforming Skulls Full of Mush: Venue Management Law 
School, FACILITY MANAGER (Jan. 6, 2015), http://magazine.iavm.org/article/transforming-skulls-full-
of-mush-venue-management-law-school/ [https://perma.cc/6AQ4-JUKT]. 
 103. It is remarkable how quickly senior legal scholars drop the conceit that consideration is 
inevitable. See, e.g., Comments of Orin K. McMurray, Papers and Discussion Concerning the Redlich 
Report, 4 AM. L. SCH. REV. 91, 110 (1916) (Law professor who variously taught at Columbia, 
Michigan, Stanford, and Boalt Law Schools: “Take the doctrine of consideration. A man who is trained 
merely in the casebooks is very likely to think that he has here something of a character like revelation, 
something fundamental, absolute, like the truths of mathematics. It is that sort of thing we want to get 
away from.”). 
 104. Small wonder that Scott Turow’s fictitious law school memoir chooses consideration to 
show not only the sadistic Prof. Perini’s abuse of the Socratic method, but also the narrator’s cleverness 
in escaping the trap. S. TUROW, ONE L 192–94 (1977). 
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political and cultural outcomes, even if universalism starts to undo these 
lessons as soon as students begin practicing law. 105 
IV. TOWARD A TYPE 1 THEORY OF LAW: INDIVIDUALS 
We have argued that Type 1 thought (a) is centrally important to legal 
reasoning, and (b) displays significant universality. The remainder of this 
Article assumes these facts and traces their implications for lawyers and 
legal institutions. This Section reviews nineteenth century claims that what 
we now call Type 1 reasoning should guide policymakers, updates those 
theories to accommodate the modern evidence for universality, and asks 
how Type 1 thought shapes the subjective experience of lawyering. 
Section V builds on these foundations by analyzing how judicial 
institutions amplify universality’s comparatively weak signals to establish 
a rough approximation to formalism.106 
A. Victorian Theory: Shelley, Arnold, and Holmes 
The idea that Type 1 thinking should guide law is nearly as old as the 
concept of aesthetic or unconscious thought itself. The argument seems to 
have originated with Percy Shelley, who claimed in 1821 that “poets are 
the unacknowledged legislators of the World.”107 Logic, he argued, was 
not strong enough to find solutions to social issues—and particularly not 
the largest and most important ones. This implied that reason’s role in 
public life, though useful, was mainly to “follow [in] the footsteps of poets, 
and copy the sketches of their creations into the book of common life.”108 
Shelley’s ideas were only published in 1840, and even then were 
slow to diffuse. It took another three decades for poet and critic Matthew 
Arnold to state them definitively. For the most part, his Culture and 
Anarchy (originally published in 1869) tracks Shelley’s argument, albeit 
with new names so that “reason” is relabeled “science,” and “imagination” 
becomes “culture.”109 However, Arnold also improved on Shelley by 
                                                     
 105. Kales, supra note 103, at 111 (According to the Northwestern Law School professor, 
practicing lawyers look to the law of their states, not what law schools think the law should be. “They 
never for one moment think of resting the rights of their clients upon Harvard Law School law, or the 
law of any other law school.”). 
 106. For concreteness, we will assume Prof. Child’s 60% universality estimate in what follows. 
However, this is probably conservative. First, Child studied visual art, which has no underlying 
objective truth for experts to converge on. We have already argued that the experience of writing and 
interpreting legal documents provides an additional and more objective standard for lawyers. Second, 
Child compared Yale-trained experts to self-taught artists. The convergence would probably have been 
greater had the latter group been formally educated the way law students are. 
 107. Shelley, supra note 30, at 508. 
 108. Id. at 501. 
 109. MATTHEW ARNOLD, CULTURE AND ANARCHY 33–34 (Jane Garnett ed., Oxford Univ. Press 
2009) (1869) (Science is the “passion, the sheer desire to see things as they are.” Culture by 
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admitting that people could disagree about what was beautiful. Building 
on his earlier work in literary theory, he argued that critics who repeatedly 
compared new art against recognized “great masters” would eventually 
reach a consensus.110 This collective refinement was especially valuable 
in politics, where it would stop charismatic individuals from leading 
society astray on the pattern of the French Revolution.111 
B. Updating the Theory 
Most of Shelley and Arnold’s logic is still viable today. Nevertheless, 
their argument had a significant defect: for aesthetic judgment to guide 
law, it must first point in some identifiable direction. But where does this 
come from? For Shelley and Arnold writing in the nineteenth century, the 
answer was obvious: the criterion of beauty and the good society already 
existed in the mind of God.112 
The question in the twenty-first century is whether Child’s more 
limited and stochastic version of universality can fill this gap. As we argue 
below, legal institutions provide a natural mechanism for converting weak 
statistical preferences into quasi-determinate rules. The more serious 
objection is that Child’s evidence is limited to choices between similar 
images. This suggests that a comparable universality in law probably does 
not hold for large choices, for example between the U.S. Constitution and 
Taiwan’s. That may explain why common law courts try to change as little 
doctrine as possible. This restriction is partly enforced by economics: the 
amount of effort that advocates spend looking for new patterns is limited 
by litigation budgets on the one hand, and judges’ reluctance to learn 
elaborate new legal theories on the other. Additionally, the rule is also 
codified in the doctrine of stare decisis.113 Significantly, all of these factors 
are flexible, implying that courts’ reluctance to make large changes could 
undergo at least some evolution over time.114 
                                                     
comparison finds “its origin in the love of perfection. . . . It moves by the force, not merely or primarily 
of the scientific passion for pure knowledge, but also of the moral and social passion for doing good.”). 
 110. For a detailed account of Arnold’s “touchstone” method of interpretation, see William G. 
Crane, The Significance of Mathew Arnold’s Critical Theory 24 (June, 1920) (unpublished master’s 
thesis, Iowa State University), http://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/4145 [https://perma.cc/42PU-DESB]. Arnold’s 
argument anticipated Child’s hypothesis that artisans become experts by making a long series of 
aesthetic choices. 
 111. See ARNOLD, supra note 109, at 51 (“[C]ulture, just because it resists this tendency of 
Jacobinism to impose on us a man with limitations and errors of his own along with the true ideas of 
which he is the organ, really does the world and Jacobinism itself a service.”). 
 112. Id. at 34 (“[N]o action or institution can be salutary and stable which are not based on the 
will of God.”). 
 113. See POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 4, at 251 (Courts are loath to abandon 
“even patently erroneous interpretations.”). 
 114. Theoretical physics illustrates how the rules of the game can evolve over time. Down to the 
early twentieth century, physicists expected new theories to postulate as few changes as possible. In 
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C. The Subjective Experience of Law 
Neural network theory teaches that judges’ brains contain elaborate 
models of the world. Formally, these encode complex equations that 
assign weights to every possible variable. It follows that the advocate’s job 
is to supply whatever combinations of data garner the biggest response 
given the judge’s limited appetite for learning new patterns. If both 
advocates knew the judge’s underlying equation exactly, one side would 
always win. But we have seen that, in fact, the full formula is too 
complicated for humans to understand. This ensures that the strongest side 
never presents its best argument, opening the door to occasional outcomes 
in which the weaker side prevails by presenting the stronger of two 
inherently imperfect arguments. 
In fact, the situation is worse than that. Given that advocates often 
know very little about their judges,115 the safest course will often be to 
assume universality116 and write for an average audience. Even then, 
however, advocates need to worry that their own views might be eccentric. 
This explains why practicing lawyers endlessly rehearse their arguments 
to colleagues, trying out new variants to find the most attractive one.117 
Grand Illusion 
One of legal realism’s biggest failings is that it says almost nothing 
about how lawyers actually practice. Watch oral argument in any 
courtroom and you will see advocates talk endlessly about “The Law” as 
if it existed outside themselves. This resembles nothing so much as the old 
claim that mathematics is never “created” but only “discovered.”118 
Legal realists, of course, dismiss this as a smokescreen to hide 
judges’ arbitrariness from a credulous public. But in that case, why do 
lawyers do the same thing in private when there is no public to play to? 
The better answer is that universality only exists as a statistical quantity—
and a fairly weak one at that. On the one hand, every lawyer shares a small 
piece of it, enough to convince her that her own instincts are far better than 
                                                     
1930, however, Wolfgang Pauli invented a new particle (the “neutrino”) as what he called a “desperate 
way out” of several deep problems in nuclear theory. The particle was duly discovered. Fifty years 
later, theorists routinely postulated large and even infinite numbers of particles. ABRAHAM PAIS, 
INWARD BOUND: OF MATTER AND FORCES IN THE PHYSICAL WORLD 315 (1986). 
 115. Most of us are reminded of this fact every December 25, when we learn anew how hard it 
is to anticipate even close relations’ taste in books and clothing. The average advocate has far fewer 
clues to individual judges’ tastes. 
 116. There is a direct parallel in publishing, where many authors and editors look for stories that 
they themselves would enjoy without considering how other humans might differ. Stephen M. Maurer, 
From Bards to Search Engines: Finding what Readers Want from Ancient Times to the World Wide 
Web, 66 S.C. L. REV. 495, 503–04 (2014). 
 117. The same principle is used in Hollywood focus groups. Id. at 526. 
 118. MARIO LIVIO, IS GOD A MATHEMATICIAN? passim (2009). 
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the average layperson’s. On the other hand, she also knows that her 
estimates are often wrong. The only way to be sure is to ask other lawyers. 
Law feels external because, in the deepest sense, it is. 
V. TOWARD A TYPE 1 THEORY OF LAW: INSTITUTIONS 
Superficially, Child’s 60% universality is only 10% better than a 
simple coin toss. Whether this matters depends on institutions. For 
example, 60% agreement among voters would be a landslide in national 
politics.119 The question for law is how court systems amplify and 
occasionally garble the signal. 
A. What Does “Rule of Law” Require? 
We begin by recalling what democratic theory seeks to accomplish. 
Congress cannot anticipate every contingency, and only returns to 
particular topics every few decades. In the meantime, rule of law requires 
that judges fill the inevitable gaps in ways that do not depart too quickly 
from what Congress wants. An ideal common law system should therefore 
be something between a dumb flywheel and a smart-ish autopilot that 
anticipates how Congress is likely to vote next time.120 
B. Is Formalism Stable? 
We have argued that lawyers’ Type 1 intuitions provide a coherent 
foundation for quasi-formalist rulemaking. But judges have other options: 
if they want to, they can equally indulge cronyism or personal politics. 
Which behavior actually prevails depends on history: as economists say, 
many equilibria are possible.121 Still, we would like to confirm that 
formalist systems really are equilibria, i.e. that once established they can 
persist indefinitely. Empirically, there is good anecdotal122 and 
statistical123 evidence that real judges respect precedent. But it would be 
better to have some deeper understanding of why this might be. 
                                                     
 119. By the standards of presidential politics, 60% is nothing short of a landslide. Largest 
Landslide Victories in US Presidential Election History, WORLD ATLAS, https://www.worldatlas. 
com/articles/largest-landslide-victories-in-us-presidential-election-history.html [https://perma.cc/ 
R2A5-RXDN] (60% of U.S. Presidential elections have been decided by less than 10%.). 
 120. Cf. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 4, at 217 (arguing that discretion need not 
be “political,” but could equally “just be random”). 
 121. For a very short survey of multiple equilibrium ideas in economics, see, e.g., Multiple 
Equilibria, ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/applied-and-social-scien 
ces-magazines/multiple-equilibria [https://perma.cc/87AF-LG2B]. 
 122. See POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 4, at 42–44, 49–50 (reporting that many 
judges decide cases according to formalist ideals). 
 123. For one of the rare recent efforts to probe judicial behavior at the trial court level, see Daniel 
L. Chen, Jens Frankenreiter & Susan Yeh, Judicial Compliance in District Courts 5 (Toulouse Sch. 
of Econ., Working Paper No. 16-715, 2016), https://www.tse-fr.eu/publications/judicial-compliance-
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Consider, then, a toy model124 where judges seek working lawyers’ 
endorsements for psychic reasons like prestige or material ones like 
promotion.125 How should judges behave? A full analysis would start from 
the formal economics of repeat games.126 Assume however, that lawyers 
earn their living by negotiating and occasionally litigating business 
transactions.127 Since risk makes deals less attractive, the best way to 
increase transactions (and lawyer income) is to make them less risky. 
Formalism does this by divorcing judges’ rulings from random cronyism 
and politics. Strangely, even cronies should dislike cronyism, since the 
prospect of neutral enforcement makes people more willing to sign 
contracts with them in the first place.128 
Cheating 
So far we have assumed that judges who depart from formalist logic 
are immediately detected. But since universality is stochastic, lawyers 
                                                     
district-courts [https://perma.cc/R67X-4PH8] (finding statistical evidence that US federal lower court 
cases filed before and resolved after higher court decisions are 29–37% more likely to rule in the same 
direction as the appellate court). 
 124. Social and natural scientists often use deliberately simplistic models to explain mechanisms 
concisely and point the way toward more complete accounts. See, e.g., Toy Model, WIKIPEDIA, https:// 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toy_model [https://perma.cc/P936-C6Z9]. 
 125. Professors Epstein, Landes and Posner argue that judicial utility is based on multiple factors 
that are plausibly consistent with the model presented here. These include internal satisfaction from 
“feeling that one has done a good job,” and the external satisfactions from “reputation, prestige, power, 
influence, and celebrity” such as the possibility of promotion to a higher court or moving to a high 
paid private sector job. LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR 
OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 48 (2013). 
 126. Economists have modeled the situation in one of two ways. First, they consider trust games 
in which Alice helps Bob because she thinks he will return the favor. If Bob makes a reciprocal 
calculation, the assumptions become self-reinforcing even though neither is enforceable. The trust 
game dynamic is particularly visible when attorneys hire local co-counsel to avoid being 
“hometowned” in unfamiliar courthouses. Having local counsel present turns what would otherwise 
be a dangerous one-time transaction into one more installment in the community’s repeat interactions. 
The second set of theories assumes that each actor inherently possesses a fixed amount of 
trustworthiness which, however, cannot be measured directly. Parties then update their estimates each 
time a request is or is not honored. For a mathematically rigorous account of repeat game literature, 
see Luís M. B. Cabral, The Economics of Trust and Reputation: A Primer (June 5, 2005) (preliminary 
draft) (on file with N.Y.U.), http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~lcabral/reputation/Reputation_June05.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DJ6J-HETJ]. 
 127. The argument assumes that the same lawyers simultaneously write contracts and appear 
before judges. While this is seldom true for individual lawyers, law firms routinely do both. 
 128. Of course, our model is only a toy. Many real lawyers make a living by representing non-
business clients like tort victims. Furthermore, court systems are embedded in larger institutions. This 
suggests that judges could decide that it is better to write decisions that pander to the ideology of 
political parties that might one day promote them. Finally, one can imagine variant models where the 
cronies are lawyers rather than litigants. Since clients are risk averse, lawyers trying to keep clients 
happy will normally lose more from downside losses than they gain from upside wins. This suggests 
that judges are most likely to please counsel on average by adopting split-the-difference strategies that 
protect both sides against deep losses. 
156 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 42:129 
cannot be sure whether judges who disagree with them are corrupt or just 
mistaken. This forces them to wait for enough large or repeated departures 
to confirm dishonesty. But of course, judges also know this, which means 
that cheaters can postpone discovery by picking and choosing how often 
they cheat.129 
C. Amplification 
Modern versions of universality need institutions to elevate weak 
signals into system-wide rules. But this is not enough: they should also 
avoid mistakes. Assume, following Child, that a single judge will arrive at 
the correct (universal) rule 60% of the time. Replacing her with a panel 
improves matters, but only slowly: a three judge panel will have the right 
answer 65% of the time, a five judge panel 73% percent, and so on.130 
The question is still more complicated when we recall that courts 
influence each other. Economists typically analyze this kind of dynamic 
through “social influence” networks where each member starts with some 
idiosyncratic belief and then modifies it each time she learns what others 
think.131 For example, Alice might influence Bob, who influences Carl, 
who then closes the circle by influencing Alice. But there could also be a 
second path in which Alice talks to Carl, who gives his opinion directly 
back to Alice. This choice of paths necessarily injects a measure of 
randomness into the calculation. Despite this, most social influence 
models seem to be well-behaved in the sense that each judge eventually 
converges on a stable, long-run opinion.132 
Real life is bound to be messier. Probably the most obvious 
complication is that courts only write opinions when plaintiffs decide that 
bringing suit will be cost-effective. This suggests that bad theories can 
linger for years waiting for a plaintiff that is either sufficiently rich or 
sufficiently desperate to attempt a revival.133 We should also expect 
                                                     
 129. Casual observers often accuse judges of ignoring the law. But judges who study an issue 
for weeks necessarily change their neural networks in the process. This suggests that casual observers 
will always see things somewhat differently and that judges are more sincere than they seem. 
 130. The estimate assumes that each judge decides independently, i.e. that no judge consults any 
other judge before deciding. To the extent that discussion makes judges more receptive to new 
patterns, the 65% figure should be seen as a lower bound. 
 131. MATTHEW O. JACKSON, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NETWORKS 228–35 (2008). The belief is 
conventionally expressed as the probability that some particular event will happen, in our case that a 
particular proposition of law becomes the majority rule. 
 132. Economists have also found solutions where members’ opinions can oscillate indefinitely. 
However, this only happens where every path that leads from Alice back to herself is the same length. 
This is unlikely for real court systems, where the order in which different circuits consider cases is 
usually random. See id. at 230–33. 
 133. One of the most spectacular examples derives from antitrust law, where litigants have 
essentially stopped writing contracts authorized by the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), even though the Court has twice declined to overrule it. 
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strategic behaviors. These include attempts to change the law through 
forum shopping and sustained campaigns in which government and 
advocacy groups continue bringing cases until the law finally changes.134 
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The age-old debate between the legal realists and formalists was 
never about policy. Indeed, the realists hardly ever denied that formalism 
and rule of law were desirable—only that they were possible. By 
comparison, recognizing the centrality of Type 1 processes implies 
important policy choices. On the one hand, policymakers must now decide 
which mode works best for each and every legal issue. On the other hand, 
Type 1 processes are largely unconscious. What can policymakers 
reasonably do to control bias? 
A. Division of Labor: Choosing Between Type 1 and Type 2 Reasoning 
Lawyers value Type 2 proofs for their transparency: being articulable 
means that anyone can check their logic. At the same time, Type 2 rules 
are inflexible and for that reason prone to absurdities.135 When this 
happens, judges and advocates can either try to construct a new Type 2 
system—as the law-and-economics movement advocates for antitrust136—
or ask whether a Type 1 solution might work better after all. 
Sometimes the answer is clear. For example, psychologists have 
shown that Type 2 judgments based on formal statistical analyses work 
better than Type 1 judgments for any problem that can be reduced to an 
actuarial table.137 This suggests that the much-maligned Federal 
                                                     
See, e.g., A.J. WEINSCHEL, ANTITRUST-INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK (2000) (advising 
practitioners that it is not “prudent” to rely on the case). 
 134. Law students often wonder why the middle third of their antitrust textbooks consists entirely 
of cases decided in the 1940s. The reason is the Roosevelt Administration, which saw the “little 
Depression” of 1937 as evidence that monopolies were strangling the economy. F.D.R. reacted by 
expanding the Justice Department’s Anti-Trust Division from a few dozen lawyers to nearly three 
hundred. The statute’s reach expanded dramatically over the next decade. DAVID M. KENNEDY, 
FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929–1945, 359 (1999). 
 135. See POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 4, at 240–41 (“[A] legal rule that is too 
specific, may for that reason lack adaptability.”). 
 136. Antitrust law provides the closest analog to policy-based decision-making in modern law. 
Once the U.S. Supreme Court gave up on per se rules in the late 1930s, every dispute revisited policy 
more or less from scratch. This must have been tempting since microeconomic theory is both 
conceptually clear and predictive. Despite this, the results have been widely criticized. See, e.g., 
Holman Jenkins, Jr., How Justice Went Wrong on AT&T: Comcast-Type Decrees May Be a Kludge, but 
They Help to Dissipate the Political Heat, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-
justice-went-wrong-on-at-t-1513125457 (Antitrust “pretends to be . . . an objective, clinical analysis of 
competitive conditions” but this only hides “a predisposition to meddle for bureaucratic or political 
reasons.”). 
 137. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 2, at 234–44. 
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Sentencing Guidelines, for example, might be the best choice after all. On 
the other hand, similarly well-defined problems are rare in law. For closer 
cases, at least, the psychology evidence suggests that judges should lean 
toward Type 1 solutions when problems are sufficiently regular to be 
predictable and common to allow prolonged practice.138 
When Type 1 methods are desirable, the best way to implement them 
will be to adopt open-ended inquiries on the pattern of the “reasonable 
man” standard139 in tort law or the various “balancing tests” beloved by 
constitutional lawyers.140 The good news, as we have argued, is that 
universality will often make these standards more determinate than they 
seem. 
Textualism vs. Intentionality 
This Article has so far focused on the global choice between Type 1 
and Type 2 rules. But Type 1 thought is itself subdivided between aesthetic 
judgments and pattern recognition. This neatly overlaps the traditional 
division between “intentionalists,” who focus on what the original drafters 
meant, and “textualists” who privilege how ordinary readers understand 
documents on average.141 It is reasonable to think that readers’ facilities 
for pattern recognition can be encouraged by, for example, doctrines that 
stress historic intent over the reader’s own subjective reactions to text. But 
in that case, which choice should the legal system make? We have 
emphasized that universality depends partly on aesthetics and partly on 
pattern recognition, and these will often pull in opposite directions. To the 
extent that we value determinacy, we should choose whichever form of 
universality proves strongest. 
B. Deciding Close Cases 
Legal scholars have long known that establishing a coherent “middle 
ground” for interpreting precedent does not guarantee determinate 
rulemaking. Instead, there will always be “hard cases” where the better 
                                                     
 138. See id. at 251. 
 139. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg., Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(criticizing “the ‘reasonable man’ and other ghosts in the law”). 
 140. As Justice Scalia complained, most balancing rules are at least formally indeterminate, 
telling judges to compare “incommensurable,” “unweighted,” and “unranked factors” without any 
“principled metric for deciding” which cases fall within the rule. John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and 
the Idea of Judicial Restraint, 115 MICH. L. REV. 747, 754–55 (2017). 
 141. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and 
the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533 (1992); John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 
91 VA. L. REV. 419 (2005); Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005). 
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interpretation is unclear.142 The modern understanding of universality 
suggests that this can happen for two reasons: 
Reason 1. Universality only exists statistically, implying that some 
well-informed individuals will normally dissent. Even when most judges 
see one view as clearly superior, a few judges may see the choice as 
indeterminate. Furthermore, the dissenters could well be different for 
every issue. 
Reason 2. Child presented his subjects with pairs in which Ivy 
League experts overwhelmingly preferred one image to the other. But 
suppose he had instead selected images where this was untrue? Logically, 
we would expect “close cases” where experts disagree to be universal as 
well. 
The problem, of course, is that judges who encounter close cases 
cannot be sure whether they are experiencing “Reason 1” or “Reason 2.” 
From this standpoint, it is probably better for each judge to give her best 
estimate for the correct outcome even in close cases, so that universality 
emerges for Reason 1 cases in the usual way. This still leaves the question 
of what to do about Reason 2 cases. Here, some individual human—
preferably the appellate courts—will have to decide. At the same time, 
democratic theory suggests that Reason 1 cases should be decided through 
universality. This means that appellate judges should normally defer to the 
lower courts once a clear majority emerges. 
C. Guarding Against Prejudice 
The problem with Type 1 judgments is that they are unconscious. 
This means that we can never be sure when prejudice enters in. Here, 
universality is a partial corrective since purely personal biases will often 
cancel each other on average. The larger question is what to do when the 
prejudices are themselves universal. For example, psychologists have 
shown that all humans prefer some faces to others.143 This makes it 
reasonable to worry that judges might sometimes rule for the prettiest 
litigant. Here, the most obvious response is to identify and correct biases 
using explicitly Type 2 statistical reasoning. The deeper problem is that 
our logical selves may not understand the patterns that machines find in 
our Type 1 reasoning. The question will then become whether we trust our 
machines enough to take corrective action on faith. 
                                                     
 142. See Dworkin, supra note 10, at 160–61 (“The distinction between hard and easy cases at 
law is perhaps just the distinction between cases that do and do not” permit “a unique interpretation” 
on the basis of fit.); POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 4, at 287 (“[M]aybe reason cannot 
decide the hard cases.”). 
 143. Renoult, supra note 72, at 283 (summarizing evidence that humans universally prefer 
average, symmetric, and sexually dimorphic faces). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that legal reasoning cannot be analyzed in 
exclusively logical, Type 2 terms. Instead, Type 1 intuitions play a crucial 
role in deciding how law evolves. Acknowledging this reality will force 
policymakers to confront significant new issues, most obviously whether 
legal doctrine should encourage Type 1 or Type 2 processes in specific 
cases. 
The surprise is universality, i.e. the tendency of lawyers to reach 
similar judgments no matter what culture they were born into. This 
provides a natural explanation for the common perception that judges feel 
significantly constrained by a middle ground that is neither “formalist” nor 
“legalist.” The account is also normatively attractive, since universality 
seems to depend on shared truths that most practicing lawyers will 
eventually come to. Apparently, law is more than identity politics after all. 
The Victorian vision that aesthetic insights will lead society to the 
mind of God are gone forever. But we can still hope to build common law 
systems that are impartial, predictable, and stable against unconscious 
bias. Compared to the claims of its predecessors, this new formalism is 
modest, imperfect, and stochastic. No matter. It will do. 
